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George J. Annast
When I was invited to give this talk I thought, "I'll just give
my standard slide show on death in America." I thought I would
just talk about the right to die, something I can do in my sleep,
and everybody would be happy. And you probably would, since
it's a pretty good speech. I am going to give it at a Pennsylvania
Judges Conference in a couple of weeks, and they will like it.'
But it is not very challenging, either for me or for you. So, what I
want to explore with you today is how judges have reacted to
legal problems physicians confront at the beginning and end of
life, and how their reactions have led to the deprofessionaliza-
don of medicine.2 I am going to suggest, in outline form, that
judges, while very well-meaning in their decisions regarding the
medical profession, have led us in a deprofessionalizing, con-
sumer-choice direction, something quite the opposite of what
they intended. Specifically, judicial decisions at the beginning
and end of life involving abortion and the right to die have cre-
ated a climate in which law has become the dominant force de-
fining medical ethics.
Health Law
First, a word about health law itself. When I broke into this
field in 1970, it really didn't have a name. Most people used the
term "legal medicine," while some people called it "law and
t George J. Annas, JD, MPH, Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University
Schools of Medicine, Law, and Public Health; Chair, Health Law Department and
Founding Director, Law, Medicine and Ethics Program, Boston University School of
Public Health. A.B. Harvard College, 1967; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1970; M.P.H.
Harvard School of Public Health, 1972. Copyright © 1996 by George J. Annas, re-
printed with permission.
1 The speech to the Pennsylvaniajudges, The Right to De in Ameiia Sloganeffing
from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevo*ian, is published at 34 DuQUE IN L REv. 875
(1996).
2 By deprofessionalization, I mean that physicians are no longer always accounta-
ble for their actions, and that as a consequence medicaljudgment has been so eroded
as to be virtually irrelevant in the contemporary practice of medicine.
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medicine." It was one of those "law and the banana" fields (as
they're referred to in law schools) that are not thought of as le-
gitimate fields of study for lawyers at all. Physicians called it "fo-
rensic medicine" which includes forensic pathology8 and
forensic psychiatry.4 So when you thought about law and
medicine in 1970, it really was forensic medicine, the title, if not
the total content, of this conference.5 That was it.
As the 70's progressed, and certainly in the 80's and 90's,
health law became a rubric which now includes at least four sub-
divisions. The first is forensic medicine, that whole field that you
are by now very familiar with. The next one is health care regu-
lation. It started out asjust medical malpractice, and sometimes
was taught as an advanced trial practice course. Next is health
care finance; there are many schools that have courses just in
health care finance, even if they don't have a health law course.
And the fourth area is what we now call bioethics, the area that I
am going to talk most about today.6
Now what is this thing we call bioethics? When the term was
first proposed in the 60's, it was thought to encompass ethics in
all the biology realms: environmental ethics, medical ethics, and
biological ethics. Bioethics as commonly practiced by ethicists,
(or "bioethicists" and sometimes called medical ethicists), has
come to be, as Dr. Cyril Wecht7 and I were talking about at
lunch, almost exclusively focused on the doctor/patient relation-
3 Expert opinion and testimony primarily regarding cause of death and extent of
physical injuries.
4 Expert opinion and testimony primarily regarding mental illness, competence,
and insanity.
5 The Quinnipiac College School of Law Conference on Forensic Evidence and
Legal Medicine, October 26-27, 1995.
6 Boston University School of Law now has a concentration in Health Law as does
Boston University School of Public Health. In the law school, we have a basic course in
Health Law, which includes health care regulation, as well as advanced courses, such as,
Antitrust in Health Care, Bioethics, Psychiatry, and Disability Law. Text books mirror
this. The West HEAL.T LAw textbook, by FarrowJohnson,Jost and Schwartz has been
broken up into three separate books: Regulation, Financing, and Bioethics. You can
buy the big book or you can buy either one in a paperback book, which are those three
subject matters. My own Little Brown textbook, AiFacAN HEALTH LAW, written with
Ken Wing, Sylvia Law and Rand Rosenblatt, will eventually be three separate books in
the same three areas as the West textbook. It is the way that both textbooks and the
field are going.
7 Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., J.D., Coroner of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, clinical Adjunct Associate Professor of Pathology, University of Pittsburgh
School of Medicine, Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
(Moderator of the Conference on Forensic Evidence and Legal Medicine at Quinnipiac
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ship. This has been in reaction to medical paternalism, and has
demanded the active involvement of the patient in decision mak-
ing. Bioethics also involves a search for values, and how people
decide value-laden questions in our society.
Health law, although now generally recognized as a real
field, is an applied field. Basically, it is all law applied to a spe-
cific sector of society. If you're a capitalist, you call it the health
care industry. You can call it medicine and science, that's fine.
It is really law applied to that sector, and it encompasses all kinds
of law. Today when we talk about values, what kind of a society
we want to be, and what role medicine and science should play
in it, we are often talking about constitutional law as applied to
this particular area. That is mostly what I am going to talk about
today."
Roe v. WadeP
The field of health law was center stage when the Supreme
Court decided Roe in 1973. When that case came to the Court
(only a few of us here are old enough to remember this), there
were two relatively new Justices on the Court from Minnesota,
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun. Jus-
tice Burger decided to assign his junior colleague from Minne-
sota to write the opinion, and Blackmun took it very seriously.
He had spent the last ten years as General Counsel to the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota and he has in retrospect, even 25
years later, called those the happiest days of his life. He did not
mean being on the Court was not a privilege and a great chal-
lenge. What he meant was that he loved working with physi-
cians. He thought it was the most fulfilling work a lawyer could
do.
Justice Blackmun was not quite as romantic about medicine
as the lawyer on Chicago Hope, Alan Birch,'" but almost. He re-
College School of Law (October 26-27, 1995); author of introductory article to this
issue).
3 See generallvAnnas, G.J., Health Law at the Turn of the Centuy: From WhiteDwarf to
Red Giant, 21 CoNN. L REv. 551 (1989).
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a more complete discussion of most of
the cases mentioned in this speech, see GeorgeJ. AnnasJUoING MEDICINE (1988) and
GeorgeJ. Annas, STANDARD OF CARE.- Tiix LAw OF AMEuCAN Bxo-mics (1993).




ally thought that medicine was wonderful, and he saw his job in
writing Roe as getting the government off the backs of physicians
so they could exercise independent medical judgment. In fact,
in The Brethren," Woodward and Armstrong wrote that Justices
Brennan and Marshall had to encourage Blackmun to acknowl-
edge and support pregnant women, not just physicians. To
Blackmun, however, the physician remained central. He put it
this way in Roe. "The decision vindicates the right of the physi-
cian to administer medical treatment according to his (sic) pro-
fessional judgment.. .the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and the basic re-
sponsibility for it must rest with the physician."' 2 And in the
much less cited companion opinion to Roe, Doe v. Bolton,'5 Black-
mun made his disdain for government regulation of medical
practice, even a required second opinion, clearer: "If a physi-
cian is licensed by the State, he (sic) is recognized by the State as
capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment... Required
acquiescence by co-practitioners has no rational connection with
a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to
practice."14
Roe and Doe have been seen as major human rights opinions
that vindicate the rights of women. They do. But mostly, the
author of the opinions was trying to help keep the government
away from the practice of medicine. That is why he character-
ized abortion as a medical decision to be made by doctors ac-
cording to medical judgment; government stay out of it! That is
where we started. Justice Blackmun in Roe and Doe tried to make
the legal system even more pro-physician, 15 but his decisions
were the first in a series that have actually helped undermine
medicine as a profession.
11 BoB WOODWARD & ScOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BREaiiREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
12 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66.
13 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1974).
14 Id, at 199.
Is Judges, as I try to tell my medical students and my physician friends, love doc-
tors. Doctors don't believe it. They always think, "I'll get sued ifI do this, I'll get sued
and go to court, it's going to be the end of my life. Thejudge is going to hate me, the
jury is going to hate me." It's all baloney. Judges identify with physicians and love
them. A doctor has to be just horrible for a judge to find her wanting and three-
quarters ofjury verdicts have always favored physicians. It'sjust the worst doctors who




The next really important bioethics case was from New
Jersey, the case of Karen Ann Quinlan.16 Karen was a young wo-
man, just 21 years of age when she was rushed to an emergency
department. She had stopped breathing for two fifteen minute
periods. Rather than just pronouncing her dead, the physicians
"successfully resuscitated" her and put her on a mechanical ven-
tilator. She never regained consciousness. Her parents were
devastated and tried to do everything to help Karen recover,
although there really was no hope from day one. After six
months they finally agreed with the physician that the ventilator
should be removed. The physician had been pushing to remove
the ventilator. Karen's father, Joseph Quinlan, who had op-
posed discontinuation, said in effect, "OK let's stop it, the time
has come. I realize there is no hope for my daughter and she
would not want to live this way." The doctor agreed.
But then the doctor made a classic mistake that many physi-
cians still make - he consulted with his lawyer, turning a medical
care question into a legal question. The doctor then returned to
the Quinlans and said, in effect, "You know I would like to do
this, but I cannot unless you get a court order that says I am
legally immune from any criminal or civil liability." This occa-
sioned the second majorjudicial move in the direction of medi-
cal deprofessionalization. The first step was Justice Blackmun
saying that government should not interfere with physicians
when they exercise medical judgment. Now we had a doctor in-
sisting on legal immunity before he would do the right thing
medically and ethically; something he believed in; something he
believed was right. Well the Quinlans were devastated. But they
found a young legal aid lawyer, Paul Armstrong, who took their
case. The trial courtjudge said he could not order the ventilator
removed because no doctor was willing to testify that it was con-
sistent with medical ethics to take Karen off the ventilator."7
This was shocking because ventilator removal was consistent with
16 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
17 In re Quinlan, 259, 848 A.2d 801, 819 (1975) ("It is significant that Dr. Morse,
[Ms. Quinlan's attending physician] a man who demonstrated strong empathy and
compassion, a man who has directed care that impressed all the experts, is unwilling to
direct Karen's removal from the respirator.") Id.
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medical ethics, even though the physicians would not say it in
public. Therefore, when the case got to the NewJersey Supreme
Court, the court was stuck with the fact that all the expert medi-
cal testimony said it was against medical ethics to take Karen off
the ventilator. How could the court deal with that?
The New Jersey Supreme Court did two interesting things.
The first was to decide that Karen had a constitutional right of
privacy which was broad enough to allow her to refuse treatment
based on Roe.'s The second was that the state had no compel-
ling interest sufficient to interfere with this right. But to get to
this latter conclusion the court had to deal with the question of
medical ethics, the protection of which had been labeled a com-
pelling state interest. Are we going to use the law to force doc-
tors to do something that they believe is ethically wrong? Or are
we going to say, we don't believe the physician witnesses; the ex-
pert witnesses lied? Courts hate to say that. Remember judges
love doctors. So, if you read the Quinlan case (and I recommend
this) you will see some strange lines regarding how physicians set
the standard of care, and the relevance of fear of liability: "The
brooding presence of such possible liability [malpractice and
criminal], it was testified here, had no part in the decision of the
treating physicians. As did Judge Muir [the trial judge], we af-
ford this testimony full credence."19 Well, I think you can only
read that last sentence as saying, "unlike the lower court, we
don't believe that the stated factor [of potential liability] has not
had a strong influence on the standards [of medical ethics] and
the decision not to remove Karen from the ventilator."
Basically what the NewJersey Supreme Court said (I'm para-
phrasing now), is that if we took these doctors aside (we know we
have to talk to them in open court, but if we could just take them
in the back room) and say to them, "Doctor, what do you think
the right thing to do is?" They would say to us, "Take her off, my
God it is horrible having someone in a persistent vegetative state,
a permanent coma on a mechanical ventilator for ten years,
twenty years, that's just awful, no one would want to live like that.
We should take her off." Since the court believed this, it rede-
fined the problem. The court said that fear of liability was the
18 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662 (1976).
19 Id., at 666-67.
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problem, and that "there must be a way to free physicians, in the
pursuit of their healing vocation, from possible contamination
by self-interest or self-protection concerns which would inhibit
their independent medical judgments for the well-being of their
dying patients."2 And this is where the famous ethics committee
comes in. The court said, in effect, 'You're worried about get-
ting sued. We can't give you blanket immunity for anything you
do, but in cases like this, where you have a patient with no rea-
sonable possibility of returning to a cognitive state and the par-
ents want the ventilator removed, go to an ethics committee, do
not come to us. If the ethics committee agrees with you, then
you can remove the ventilator with criminal and civil immunity."
I am sure Chief Judge Hughes felt, like Justice Blackmun,
that he was supporting the medical profession, supporting medi-
cal judgment and supporting medical ethics, by getting the law
off physician's backs so that they could do the right thing. He
believed that if he just gave the physicians legal immunity, they
would go out and do the right thing. The physicians in Quinlan
did go to an ethics committee and got immunity and they did
remove Karen from the ventilator. As you may remember, she
nonetheless continued breathing on her own, largely because
the doctors slowly weaned her off the ventilator. She lived an-
other nine years. Her parents did not believe in removing her
feeding tube, an act which would be a major legal issue in the
right to die arena for the next decade.
Fortunately almost all Americans agree with the outcome of
the Quinlan decision. Almost everyone has said (if they were
alive at the time of the Quinlan case, or thinking about it), "I
never want to be like Karen Ann Quinlan. If I'm never going to
regain consciousness, don't let me linger like that." The Quinlan
case energized the living will movement; people wrote things
like: "I don't want to be kept alive on machines if there is no
hope for me ever recovering from a coma or severe brain
damage."




The feeding tube issue was much harder than the mechani-
cal ventilator for a lot of people, as it was for Karen Quinlan's
parents. It is harder because feeding, even by feeding tube, has
symbolic overtones. Nobody thinks people are required to avail
themselves of all available medical machinery, like ventilators
and dialysis machines, to stay alive. But aren't feeding tubes dif-
ferent? Isn't food something natural, not medical, and so some-
thing that should be provided to you? Although it took some
time, courts ultimately said that feeding, at least through tubes,
is a medical treatment and can be refused like any other medical
treatment. Basically, the right of privacy was defined as a right to
make decisions central to one's personhood, and the right to
liberty was defined as a right not to be touched or treated with-
out your consent, which included not being touched by doctors
and nurses. So no exception was made for feeding tubes, and
the law continued to be that patients can refuse any medical inter-
vention, including tube feeding. That seemed to be fine until the
Cruzan case got to the U.S. Supreme Court.
2 1
Nancy Cruzan was a young woman like Karen Quinlan, al-
most the same age, who was (as a result of an automobile acci-
dent) in a persistent vegetative state, exactly the same medical
condition. The only difference was that Nancy was not on a
mechanical ventilator; tube feeding was all she needed to stay
alive. Nancy Cruzan's parents finally decided that it was too
much, that she would not want to stay alive like that. They
wanted to disconnect the feeding tube. Nancy was a ward of the
State of Missouri at the time and the state insisted that the par-
ents go to court to get immunity for the physicians. Like the
doctors in Quinlan, her doctors would not do the right thing
without a court's blessing. The trial court ruled that removal was
perfectly appropriate. Unlike most cases, however, in this case
the state decided to appeal.22 The Missouri Attorney General
21 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 281 (1990).
22 Missouri is one of the leading right to life states, one of the two states where
most of the abortion cases that get to the U.S. Supreme Court come from: Missouri and
Pennsylvania. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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thought he was doing a good thing for his own career by appeal-
ing this case, so he did.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court.23
The court agreed that every competent adult has the right to
refuse any treatment, the right to say, "Don't touch me without
my consent." It is almost an absolute right. But if you really take
informed consent seriously, the court stated, refusal needs to be
informed as well. But Nancy Cruzan was in a coma and could
not talk. So to effectively refuse treatment, the court insisted
that she would have had to have said something like, "If I am
ever in a persistent vegetative state, if I am ever like Karen Ann
Quinlan, and all I need to sustain my life is tube feeding, I do
not want any tube feeding even though I know I may die a slow
death without tube feeding."
On a theoretical level this does makes some sense. But on a
real, practical level, the way we live our lives, it makes no sense.
In any event, Crzman went to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990,
when the Court was gearing up to overturn Roe. It looked as if
the Court had the votes to overtumn Roe (possibly a five *to four
split) and it looked as if the Court didn't want to expand the
concept of privacy before it got back to abortion. So, the Court
did not follow Quinlan, in that it did not use the word "privacy."
Instead the Court stated that Nancy Cruzan had a liberty interest
in refusing treatment.24 But the Court also held that Missouri
could procedurally define how she could exercise her liberty.
Missouri required a very high level (clear and convincing) of evi-
dentiary proof of Nancy's wishes before the court had to author-
ize removal of life sustaining treatment per her guardian's
wishes. Since the Cruzans had not presented that level of proof
at the lower court, the Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri
Supreme Court's ruling.23
The Cruzan opinion turned out the way it did because of
Justice Rehnquist's wooden application of what he considered a
basic rule in a close case. There has to be a presumption (many
doctors have said this also, and it's usually true) that you "err on
the side of life." Put another way, if the choice is between life
23 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
24 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
25 Id., at 284.
1996]
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LAW
and death, we should always choose life. In general this is cer-
tainly correct, but in Cruzan this was not the choice. The choice
was between death and death. How long do you want to be co-
matose before you die? That is an almost meaningless question.
If it is life and death, it is easy; all of us know how to make that
decision, but these are death and death choices. Since we are a
death-denying culture, it is especially hard because we do not
think we are ever going to die. The Justices were basically split
four to four. Justice Sandra O'Connor decided the case by go-
ing with the ChiefJustice.26
Justice O'Connor generally agreed with Justice Rehnquist
but she also agreed with dissenterJustice William Brennan, that
is, that twenty-one-year-old women don't go around thinking
about how they might die and what things physicians might use
to take care of them and keep them alive if they are in a coma. 7
She thought, however, that Nancy might reasonably have said,
"IfI can't make medical decisions for myself, I'd like my mother
to make them for me." Justice O'Connor thought that if she had
said this, it would be a constitutionally protected delegation of
decision making authority.28 O'Connor's concurring opinion,
though not the holding in the Cruzan case, energized the health
care proxy moyement, encouraging people to name someone to
make health care decisions for them. Most states have since
passed health care proxy laws which provide an easy mechanism
for people to designate someone else to make decisions for them
in case they are not able to make them for themselves. That
makes perfect sense to me. But again, it's more theoretical than
practical.
Unfortunately, Americans will not sign forms like this.
Americans hate to sign organ donor cards, wills, or even living
wills or health care proxies. How many of you have a living will
or health care proxy? Very few. So even though we have the
legal mechanisms in place, Americans are not going to use them:
there's no legal solution to the death problem. So that was
Cruzan, a partial procedural solution, again letting the doctors
off the hook by concentrating on procedural mechanisms rather
26 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287.




than insisting that physicians do the right thing by honoring
their patient's wishes, as personally expressed or as expressed on
their behalf by their family.
Casey v. Planned Parenthood9
Then came Casey. Everyone assumed that Casey was going to
overrule Roe I assumed that Presidents Bush and Reagan, who
had appointed Justices of the Supreme Court on the basis that
they agreed to overtun Roe, finally had six votes to overturn Roe.
At least it looked that way. So I think every honest legal com-
mentator was astonished when they read the so-called joint opin-
ion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor again took the lead and, with
Justices Souter and Kennedy, wrote the joint opinion. Although
Casey did not overturn Roe, it did reinterpret Roe. The core of
Roe, which remains true today, is that the states cannot criminal-
ize abortion prior to fetal viability."0 But regulation got easier
under Casey. States can now bother women a lot more than
before. States no longer need to demonstrate a compelling in-
terest to have a waiting period, they merely cannot "unduly bur-
den" a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. And
women do not have a right to privacy any more, they have a
"right to liberty,"just like in Cruzan. Nonetheless, it was a terrific
opinion that substantially saved Roe.
For my purpose today, the most important lines in the joint
opinion are the ones about the doctor and patient. We have
been talking about what doctors should do, and whether there is
a profession of medicine that involves the exercise of medical
judgment. Justice O'Connor, who is responsible for this part of
the opinion, writes: "Whatever Constitutional status the doctor-
patient relation may have, [and she's going back to Blackmun's
opinion in Roe which says abortion is a medical decision] as a
general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the wo-
man's position."3 ' According to Casey, the doctor-patient rela-
tionship does not underlie or override the two more general
rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to
29 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
30 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65.
31 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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make family decisions, which comes from Griswold v. Connecti-
cu 32 and Skinner v. Oklahoma as and the right to physical auton-
omy, which is exemplified in Cruzan (the right not to have
doctors touch or treat you without your consent.) So, the Court
regrounded the abortion right in terms of liberty (decision mak-
ing) and bodily integrity (the right not to be touched), and re-
pudiated the notion of independent physician rights and the
medical nature of the abortion decision. In fact, in the joint
opinion, physicians may as well not exist as a profession. They're
technicians. They really have no judgment to exercise other
than deciding how to technically perform the abortion proce-
dure. In this regard the Court moved to the polar opposite ex-
treme of Blackmun's view of doctors in Roe.
Medicine Today
So, where are we today? How have physicians fared under
judicial love,judges who want to make the lives of physicians bet-
ter by getting the law out of their lives? Judges have done two
things. They have tried to define the personal value decisions of
individual Americans as medical decisions, as Blackmun did in
Roe and they have tried to give physicians legal immunity for
doing what their patients (and the families of their patients who
couldn't talk for themselves) wanted them to do. Both of those
actions have, I believe, severely undercut the profession of
medicine. One of the hallmarks of professionalism is responsi-
bility, accountability for one's acts. Immunity eliminates ac-
countability. Nor could anyone ultimately accept Blackmun's
argument that the abortion decision is fundamentally a medical
decision to be made by the doctor. Nonsense. The decision
must be made by the woman, grounded in her liberty, not the
doctor's liberty. Blackmun's physician-centered Roe was so un-
dercut by the patient-centered view of O'Connor in CasV that
the physician is cut out entirely.
We now celebrate individualism in the United States in
terms of rights talk in general, and patients' rights in particular.
It is the right of patients to make choices, to do what they want.
Doctors are no longer medical professionals who must use medi-
32 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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cal judgment under the applicable professional standard of care.
They are "providers" who respond to consumer demand8 4
The American Medical Association (AMA) has failed to get
effectively involved with critical medical ethical issues. It's pa-
thetic. The AMA does have a Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, but it's unimpressive. In a recent statement the AMA
said it is ethically acceptable to kill an anacephalic child, who is
legally alive, in order to take its organs.3 5 You may or may not
agree with that, but that is a bizarre ethical position to take in
1995 when you would think the plight of forty million uninsured
people might be a little higher on the agenda than harvesting a
few more organs by killing anencephalic newborns. Recently, in
an infamous deal with Newt Gingrich to take more money to
sign on the Medicare Reform Dismantling Act, the AMA spokes-
man said it was not true that they took "billions of dollars" for
their votes.2 6 He said in the front page of the New York Times,
"There isn't a precise figure. We don't know the amount"
37
Now, I don't expect the AMA or the American Bar Association to
be unconcerned about the income of their members. Obviously
that is their primary goal; but it should not be their only goal. It
is sad when the AMA becomes so self-interested that it undercuts
anything that might be called either ethics or professionalism.
But that seems to be where we are.
Choice and the Market
With the defeat of the Clinton Health Care Plan, we seem to
have decided not to have a national health insurance scheme.
The Clinton Plan was fought on the basis of one word with the
Harry and Louise ads. One word, the same word we have been
talking about; we do not call it liberty any more, we call it
"choice." The Clinton Plan was going to take away your choice.
And when we are talking about abortion, we are talking about
choice; the right to die, my choice. Choice has overwhelmed
34 See George J. Annas, Refrarning the Debate on Health Care by Replacing Our Meta-
phors, 332 Nnw ENGL.J. Mmn. 744 (1995).
35 Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ
Donors, 273 JAMA 1614 (1995). This opinion has since been repudiated by the AMA.
36 Robert Pear, AMA Defends Its Decision to Back Medicare Proposals, NY Timps, Oct.




America, and what is choice? Well, it turns out it is even more
an American characteristic than liberty. Choice is based on the
market. Anything I have the money to buy, I should be able to
buy. My choice. That is a classic American value. And now we
have decided that we are going to apply the market, together
with rights talk, to medicine. And it seems a perfect fit, espe-
dally since we have now deprofessionalized doctors. Doctors no
longer use medicajudgment and are not accountable for their
decisions, so consumer-patients will make the decisions. Physi-
cians should just carry out our wishes; they are only technicians.
Most physicians have fallen right in line.
New managed care plans and Health Maintenance Organi-
zations (HMOs) are advertised on the television all the time.
HMO ads have taken over from the cigarette ads, and what do
they advertise? They advertise choice. Choice is exactly what
you can't have when you join an HMO. HMOs know Americans
want choice, so they advertise it. They advertise all sorts of spe-
cialists to get you to sign up for their plan. But the whole point
of their plan is to save money by keeping you away from their
specialists. The new name for your primary care physician is
"gatekeeper." You get a primary care physician, but we call her a
gatekeeper and herjob is to keep you away from those specialists
and out of those expensive hospitals. That literally is her job.
And if physicians do not do it, if they don't save money for the
plan or follow plan protocols, they can be fired. And their con-
tracts provide that they can be fired without cause.
Managed care executives note that society gave the medical
profession an unlimited budget, and they overspent it. They've
broken the bank. Now,:the managers argue, they must tell physi-
cians how to practice medicine. This sounds bad, but the man-
agers insist it is reasonable because physicians did not know how
to practice medicine anyway;- they did not have any standards.
Physicians did what the financial incentives dictated under fee
for service payment. We also say that about lawyers all the time.
David Wecht08 said it this morning, that it is just a question of
money. Well, in one sense, lawyers really are hired guns and
38 David N. Wecht, Esq., AIDS: Medica4 Legal and Societal Concerns, Address at the
Forensic Evidence and Legal Medicine Conference at Quinnipiac College School of
Law (Oct. 27, 1995).
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certainly, when you are in an adversarial system, it is a question
of money. But you do not expect law to be only a question of
money. You do expect there to be some rules. Even in the OJ.
Simpson case,39 we expected some rules ofjustice to be followed
and we were disappointed, I hope, in Judge Ito for not control-
ling that circus.
We expect justice not to be for sale. And we certainly ex-
pect health care and medical care not to be for sale. Right now
they are. The reason physicians cannot fight against the market,
now that the market is running medicine, is because there is no
strong medical ethics core to the medical profession. Now doc-
tors are often told what their profile is going to be. Doctors are
now told how many patients they can see, what tests they can do,
and what they can and cannot say to their patients. This is be-
cause doctors cannot credibly say, "I have professional ethics.
There are some things I cannot do. I am a patient advocate. I
have an ethical obligation to advocate for my patients. I must be
loyal to my patients." Physicians should be able to say that, but
they can't because they have not done it. This is at least partly
because physicians have been given a blank check by the judici-
ary and by American society for the last twenty-five years, and
they have used it to act irresponsibly.
And doctors are not ready to take responsibility even now.
They have convinced themselves that the main problem in
medicine is malpractice litigation. Malpractice is a big problem
and should be dealt with directly. But malpractice litigation is a
trivial issue in the grand scheme of things. Even the Republicans
know this, but they are happy to give a bone to the AMA if that is
what they want, to get their support for much more important
issues in terms of how much hospitals and doctors will be paid by
Medicare. In trying to do good for doctors, and I believe both
Justice Blackmun andJustice Hughes wanted to do good for doc-
tors, they thought they were supporting the profession of
medicine. By granting them immunity, and by saying that pa-
tient decisions were really doctor decisions, the judges thought
they were upholding this grand tradition of the Hippocratic
Ethic, that is, do no harm, be loyal to your patients and act in




their best interests. But patient decisions are patient decisions.
Granting physicians prospective legal immunity is just another
way of condoning and encouraging irresponsible, unaccounta-
ble and therefore unprofessional decision making. This is sim-
ply not acceptable. So the new rule is that doctors do whatever
the health care plan tells them to do. That is what managed care
is. It's not so much about managing the patients as managing
the doctors.
Physician-Assisted Suicide
Once we conclude that medicine really is a consumer good,
that physicians should do what their consumer-patients want,
that patients have rights and they have the light to tell you what
to do, the next step is inevitable. Remember with Cruzan and
Quinlan we were talking about the right to refuse treatment: the
right to refuse to be touched or treated, to be left alone. But we
often did not use that term. It was too clumsy, the right to refuse
treatment did not sound right. We like slogans in this country,
so we used the "right to die." The right to die was shorthand for
the right to refuse treatment, but not for the average American.
The right to die sounds like a real right, a positive right, not a
negative right, not the right to be left alone - the right to be
killed.
So Americans are now saying, "Look doctor, you're taking
such lousy care of people at the end of life-abandoning them,
not giving them sufficient pain medication, not letting people
die with their families, making people die in Intensive Care
Units in pain and in misery-that I'd prefer to just end it all.
Kill me." Well, the doctors first said, "That is against our medical
ethics." To which the American public basically said, "Nonsense,
you don't have any medical ethics. You doctors do whatever we
pay you to do. You're technicians."
Physicians are seen as reasonable suicide assisters for two
reasons. Number one, physicians have the magic pills. This is
the rationale behind Oregon's Ballot Measure 16,40 which gives
40 Death With Dignity Act ("An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and
has been determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffer-
ing from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die,
may make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a
humane and dignified manner in accordance with this Act.") Section 2.01.
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doctors immunity for prescribing lethal drugs to terminally ill
patients with six months or less to live."' Why should doctors be
upset about that? "Don't talk to us about medical ethics," the
Oregon voters said, "give us pills. You do what we say." Doctors'
rights are derivative, as Justice O'Connor said, from their pa-
tients. 42 "If we tell you to do it, and you get immunity, you have
nothing to say about it any more. You have no medical judg-
ment to exercise. No medical ethics to uphold. You have no risk
or accountability, you do what we say, it's our choice. Kill us."
Actually the pills are a compromise. 'We will kill ourselves, but
physicians, you give us the pills to make sure we can kill our-
selves cleanly."
Even though doctors have become technicians, we have re-
tained the belief that doctors are special. They are not special
any more in the sense of medical judgment, but they still come
with the Hippocratic tradition of beneficence, that doctors actu-
ally try to do good, really try to help people. That's why Oregon
Ballot Measure 16 and other measures don't allow you to go to
your local druggist and get the pills, nor do they authorize the
sale of the pills at a supermarket like Stop & Shop or a conven-
ience store like the local 7-11. We want our pills from a physi-
cian, because we just don't want their technique, we want their
blessing. This is the second reason we want physicians involved.
We want the doctor to say, not just "Here are the pills to kill
yourself," but "It's a good idea. It's OK to do it." It turns out to
be hard to kill yourself. It turns out we don't like to do it our-
selves. It is a little messy. Although it is perfectly legal: there is
no law against suicide in this country. The right to die move-
ment in this country, however, says we want a doctor to prescribe
it.
So far, however, except for Ballot Measure 16 in Oregon,
the law has not gone that way. Suicide has been decriminalized,
but there is no constitutional right to kill yourself and no consti-
tutional right to have somebody else kill you or assist in your
suicide. The only argument that there might be, since you must
41 Death With DignityAct ("No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability
or professional disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance with this
Act. This includes being present when a qualified patient takes the prescribed
medicine to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.") Section 4.01(1).
42 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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have a physician involved is, well, isn't physician-assisted suicide
just like abortion? The woman cannot abort herself, that is what
Roe is all about; the doctor performs the abortion. So if you are
going to say it is a constitutional right for a woman to have a
doctor perform an abortion on her, why shouldn't it be a consti-
tutional right for a terminally ill patient to have a doctor help
her die? Judge Noonan in his 9th Circuit Opinion,4 3 was amazed
that people cannot tell the difference between an abortion and
killing a patient. I agree with him,44 but he should have taken
the analogy more seriously, since there are some striking
similarities.
Moreover, since we are a technological society, we are always
looking for technological fixes. One thing we are looking for is
an abortion pill which could solve the problem of getting doc-
tors involved at all. Women would be able to take a pill and
effectively perform an abortion on themselves. RU486 5 is not
like this yet, since you have to see a doctor three times to take it,
but someday women should be able to take a pill at home and
43 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9 Cir. 1995).
4- Four months after this speech Noonan's decision was reversed in an 8-3 en banc
decision. Relying on Casey and Cruzan, the court held that terminally ill patients have a
constitutional liberty right to have physicians prescribe lethal drugs for them to take
themselves in order to end their lives and that the state cannot interfere with this right
by declaring such an act an assisted suicide, and therefore, illegal. Compassmn in Dyingv.
Washingon, 79 F.Sd 790 (9th Cir. 1996). The court's position was that physicians' pre-
scriptions of lethal drugs for terminally ill patients is just another choice that individu-
als should have. As to the question of medical ethics and whether physicians themselves
might have any reason not to accede to patient requests for lethal drugs, the court
concludes not only that the Hippocratic Oath "does not represent the best or final word
on medical or legal controversies today" but also that the court believes doctors will do
whatever courts tell them itis legal to do regardless of their traditions. Id., at 829. Draw-
ing on the abortion analogy, the court writes:
[R]egardless of the AMA or its position, experience shows that most doctors
can readily adapt to a changing legal climate. Once the Court held that a
woman has a constitutional right to have an abortion, doctors began per-
forming abortibns routinely and the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion remained undiminished. Similarly, following the recognition of a
constitutional right to assisted suicide, we believe that doctors would engage
in the permitted practice when appropriate, and that the integrity of the
medical profession would survive without blemish.
Id., at 829-830. Nonetheless, the court did not require physicians to follow their pa-
tients' wishes in assisted suicide, it said it was only "extending a choice to doctors as well
as to patients.. ." Id., at 880. See also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir. 1996)
(holding New York statutes that penalize assisted suicide unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment).
45 Manufactured by Roussel Uclaf and commonly referred to as the "French abor-
tion pill."
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perform an abortion on themselves. Then we would not have to
involve the benevolent medical profession. We can argue about
whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. To the extent that
abortion is a moral decision for which women should take re-
sponsibility, an abortion pill would mean that women alone
would take responsibility for abortions.
On the other end of life, suicide, we also want a pill. We
want a "magic pill" to end our lives. A cyanide capsule or an
overdose of morphine, or whatever, we don't care, as long as it
works. What we seek at both ends of life is choice and control.
Control and Medicine
We want to control nature. We want to control birth, to
control death, and to control our lives. But no matter how many
choices we get to make we are never going to be able to control
our lives or our deaths. As Americans we hate to accept that
there are going to be limits to our lives. We do not accept death.
We do not accept unwanted pregnancies. We do not accept
anything.
Dr. Wecht46 mentioned that in the future we are going to
have more genetic tests, and we will. We are going to have, for
example, tests for the breast cancer gene, predictive tests for co-
lon cancer, predictive tests for Alzheimer's disease. What do we
have in law or medical practice to prevent those tests from being
performed on fetuses and to prevent women from demanding
an abortion if their fetus has the breast cancer gene or the colon
cancer gene or the Alzheimer's gene? I am going to give you a
personal opinion: prenatal screening for genes that predispose
one to a late onset disease followed by abortion is horrific. All of
us are going to die of something, and if we live long enough,
that something is going to have a genetic component to it. We
will be able to detect what that genetic component is likely to be
in a fetus. But there is no genetically perfect child. All children
(and all of us) are imperfect and mortal.
If our goal in using medicine to enhance choice is to have
perfect people, or immortal people, we will fail. Neither perfec-
tion nor immortality are reasonable goals. We must stop our ob-
46 C. Wecht, supra note 7.
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sessive silliness about immortality and perfect kids. We must
concentrate on quality of life rather than quantity of life, and
recapture a medical profession that is willing to help us make
responsible choices by making some judgments. I think there is
still a chance to get our medical profession back - but we will not
do it by pretending that personal decisions are medical deci-
sions, or by giving physicians immunity for following medical
ethics or making medical judgments. Give us some advice. Tell
us, for example, that it is against medical ethics to use prenatal
screening techniques to identify fetuses that have a genetic pre-
disposition to breast cancer or Alzheimer's disease. We need
our physicians to enter into a dialogue with the American public
not just about what we can do, but what we should do; not just
about what is possible, but what is right and good; notjust about
what techniques we can apply, but whether or not we should ap-
ply them, and what our goals are.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn provides a useful closing thought to
the question of whether we should be happy to have the law
trump medical ethics. Asked in 1978 to give a commencement
address at Harvard University, shortly after he had come to the
US from the USSR, he readily conceded that a society with no
objective legal scale is a "terrible one," but forcefully argued that
a society with only a legal scale is equally dreadful:
A society [medical profession] that is based on the letter of
the law and never reaches any higher is taking small advan-
tage of the high level of human possibilities. The letter of the
law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on
society. Whenever the tissue of life [medical practice] is wo-
ven of legalistic relations, there is an atmosphere of medioc-
rity, paralyzing man's (sic) noblest impulses.47
47 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Exhausted West, HARVARD MAGAZrNE, July/Aug.
1978, at 22, quoted and discussed in GeorgeJ. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewic.:
Decision Making for the Terminally 271 ncompeten 4 Am. J. LAw & MED. 367 (1979).
[Vol. 1:93
